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Abstract 
After considering a proposal to require the engagement partner’s signature on the audit report 
(PCAOB 2009), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board chose instead to only require 
the disclosure of the engagement partner’s name (PCAOB 2015). This choice was made, 
however, with little supporting theory or empirical evidence. We make predictions regarding the 
behavioral effects of the two proposed requirements using insights from social norm activation 
theory, and test those predictions using an experimental audit market setting found in the 
literature. We find that both requirements reduce misreporting in the audit report compared to a 
control setting with neither requirement present. Using a multivariate regression analysis, we 
also document that the signature requirement generates an incremental reduction in misreporting 
when added to the disclosure requirement. Finally, we provide evidence that the effects we 
document are driven by participants with higher sensitivity to social norms as measured by a 
pre-experiment personality questionnaire. This evidence supports our social norm theory and 
suggests that policymakers should consider such theory in future policy deliberations. This 
evidence also supports the new identity disclosure requirement at the PCAOB and helps explain 
the existence of signature requirements in many non-U.S. countries. 
Keywords: audit quality; auditor identity disclosure; auditor signature, social norm activation 
Data Availability: Experimental data is available from the authors upon request. 
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Introduction 
In 2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury Advisory Committee recommended (Recommendation 6) that the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) undertake a standard-setting initiative to consider requiring the 
engagement partner’s signature on the audit report (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008). A similar signature 
requirement exists in many non-U.S. countries (Chen, Lin, and Lin 2007; Fargher, Lee, and Mande 2008; Carcello 
and Li 2013). The PCAOB promptly undertook this standard-setting initiative (PCAOB 2008, PCAOB 2009), arguing 
that a signature requirement would improve the transparency of the audit process and increase the engagement 
partner’s sense of accountability. In solicited comments, auditors generally opposed the signature requirement 
(Deloitte 2008; Ernst & Young 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009), investors and investor groups favored it, and 
preparers (management and board members) were divided (Carcello and Santore 2015). The Auditing Standards 
Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association also advised caution due to scarce 
research and inconclusive evidence (King, Davis, and Mintchik 2012). In the face of this opposition, the PCAOB 
chose instead to only require the disclosure of the engagement partner’s name on the audit report (PCAOB 2015). 
The purpose of this study is to provide theory and empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of the two proposed 
requirements recently considered by the PCAOB. We make predictions regarding the behavioral effects of the two 
requirements using insights from social norm activation theory (Bicchieri 2006), and test our predictions using an 
experimental audit market setting based on Magee and Tseng’s (1990) economic model of audit pricing and 
independence. In the model, an auditor is hired by a client to report the value of an asset, and investors purchase the 
asset from the client at whatever value the auditor reports. In experimental research based on the model, strategic 
behavior arises whereby auditors receive premium audit fees from clients in exchange for misreporting a low value 
asset as high value. This strategic behavior transfers wealth from investors to the client and the auditor, and represents 
a loss of auditor independence. Given the incentive to violate independence, researchers have used this audit market 
setting to examine the effects of financial incentives, moral reasoning, and social norms on audit quality (Calegari, 
Schatzberg, and Sevcik 1998; Schatzberg, Sevcik, Shapiro, Thorne, and Wallace 2005; Blay, Gooden, Mellon, and 
Stevens 2018b). We manipulate whether the auditor’s name is publicly disclosed to investor participants and whether 
auditors also sign off on the audit report by typing their name.1 This allows us to examine the effect of an identity 
disclosure requirement on audit quality as well as the incremental effect of a signature requirement. 
Experimental researchers have recently studied the effect of sign-off requirements on opportunistic behavior. For 
example, Davidson and Stevens (2013) find evidence that signing off on a code of ethics reduces manager opportunism 
by “activating” (increasing the salience of) social norms found in the code. Similarly, Blay et al. (2018b) find evidence 
that requiring the auditor to sign off on the audit report increases audit quality by activating social norms for honesty 
and responsibility. Neither study, however, discloses the names of the manager or the auditor to investors. To date, 
the only published experimental study that we are aware of that directly tests the two proposed requirements 
considered by the PCAOB has found evidence that neither one would increase audit quality.2 In particular, Cianci, 
Houston, Montague, and Vogel (2017) find that audit partners make less conservative write-down recommendations 
when they are told to assume that the PCAOB has issued a new standard requiring their name to be disclosed or 
requiring their signature on the audit report. However, the authors used a mailed experimental survey with audit 
partners who, as a group, generally opposed the two regulatory options. This may explain their finding that the two 
requirements yielded more aggressive writedown judgments by negatively impacting the partners’ commitment to the 
profession and the public. 
The PCAOB initially argued that a signature requirement would improve audit quality because “a person exhibits a 
different behavior when they sign their name to something” (PCAOB 2008). This argument implies a behavioral effect 
of a signature requirement, but provides little guidance as to the theory behind this effect. Similar to Blay et al. (2018b), 
we argue that audit quality can be improved to the extent that social norms for honesty and responsibility are activated 
                                                          
1 We chose to have participants type rather than manually sign their name for practical as well as theoretical reasons. First, this allowed us to 
maintain strong controls consistent with prior experimental audit markets with sign-off requirements (Blay et al. 2018b). Second, in practice auditors 
commonly provide a digital copy of their signature when a signature requirement is present. Nevertheless, experimental evidence suggests that 
manually signing one’s name rather than printing it can have an incremental behavioral effect associated with one’s identity (Kettle and Haubl 
2011). This suggests that having participants type their name was a conservative signature manipulation. 
2 In a related experimental study, Lambert, Luippold, and Stefaniak (2018) find evidence that audit partner disclosure on the audit report increases 
accounting information contagion. In particular, they find evidence that prospective investors are less likely to invest in a peer firm linked to a 
restating firm via audit partner disclosure, in comparison with a restating firm linked only by industry and auditor. They also find evidence that 
knowledge of the partner’s name increases the extent to which investors attribute blame to the partner for a restatement. 
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in the auditor. We base our behavioral effects, therefore, on the ability of both the identity disclosure requirement and 
the signature requirement to activate these social norms in the auditor. Similar to the way these two requirements have 
been implemented in practice, our research design avoids external accountability effects caused by increased auditor 
liability. Thus, we examine internal and external accountability effects caused by one’s identity and the perceived 
behavioral expectations of others.3 We find that both proposed requirements reduce the amount of misreporting in the 
audit report compared to a control setting with neither requirement present. In a multivariate regression analysis, we 
also document that the signature requirement generates an incremental reduction in misreporting when added to the 
disclosure requirement. 
Our experimental study contributes theory and empirical evidence that should be useful to both researchers and 
policymakers. Audit quality is a multifaceted and ill-defined construct that is difficult to measure using audit 
engagements in practice due to confounds and simultaneous effects (King et al. 2012). In addition, it is difficult to 
capture the theoretical effects of a given regulatory policy because only one regulation regime is observed in a given 
jurisdiction and/or the regulation has been present for many years.4 This may explain why researchers have found 
mixed results using archival methods. An archival study of UK firms by Carcello and Li (2013), for example, found 
that an audit partner signature requirement improved audit quality whereas a study of firms in the UK and the 
Netherlands by Blay, Notbohm, Schelleman, and Valencia (2014) found no effect. We provide a powerful test of 
theory by directly manipulating the two requirements considered by the PCAOB using an experimental audit market 
found in the literature, and observing their effects on an important aspect of audit quality: auditor independence. 
Our study also advances the auditing literature by demonstrating the usefulness of social norm theory in examining 
auditing regulations and public policy. Researchers in financial and managerial accounting have incorporated social 
norm theory into the theory of the firm, and have found it useful to examine public policy proposals (Davidson and 
Stevens 2013) and explain prior anomalous results in the experimental literature (Douthit and Stevens 2014, Abdel-
Rahim and Stevens 2018).5 This research follows the advice of Brown, Evans, and Moser (2009) in using the stark 
predictions of neoclassical economic theory to provide strong tests of alternative behavioral theories. Researchers in 
auditing, however, have only recently begun to incorporate insights from social norm theory into economic models of 
audit pricing and independence. For example, Blay et al. (2018b) use an experimental audit market similar to ours to 
demonstrate that making third-party investors salient and requiring an auditor sign-off without disclosure can improve 
audit quality by activating social norms in the auditor. Similar to their experimental study, we provide evidence that 
the effects we document are driven by participants with higher sensitivity to social norms as measured by a pre-
experiment personality questionnaire, the Jackson Personality Inventory-Revised, (JPI-R hereafter), (Jackson 1994). 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section we present a review of relevant theory and 
evidence in the literature and develop the hypotheses we test. In the third section we describe the experimental method 
we use to test our hypotheses. In the fourth section we present the results of our experimental study, and in section 
five we conclude. 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
The PCAOB based its initial arguments for the audit partner signature requirement (PCAOB 2009) and the eventually 
chosen identity disclosure requirement (2015) on the potential for such requirements to increase audit quality by 
increasing transparency and accountability in the audit. The traditional definition of accountability in social 
psychology is “the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and 
actions to others” (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 255). Accountability research suggests that people seek approval from 
the audience to which they are accountable by adopting the known views of that audience (Buchanan, Tetlock, and 
Reed 1996; Tan, Jubb, and Houghton 1997; Wilks 2002). This suggests a behavioral effect of the two requirements 
on audit quality based on potential justification to investors (Hoffman and Patton 1997). However, it is unlikely that 
                                                          
3 As we discuss further below, external accountability effects caused by increased auditor liability would likely strengthen our behavioral theoretical 
link between the proposed regulations and audit quality. 
4 Many countries, such as Australia and Taiwan, have long histories of requiring auditor signatures making it difficult to study the effects of such 
a requirement (Carey and Simnett 2006; Chi and Chin 2011). The new disclosure requirement in the U.S. became effective for audits on or after 
December 15, 2017. Thus, it will soon be possible for researchers to use archival data to examine the effect of the new identity disclosure 
requirement on audit quality. Nevertheless, due to the inherent measurement and control issues related with archival studies, researchers and 
policymakers would benefit from theory and empirical evidence developed in highly controlled experimental settings such as ours. 
5 For a thorough review of the growing body of research incorporating social norms into the theory of the firm, see Stevens (2019). 
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engagement partners would expect to justify their actions to investors in practice (Carcello and Li 2013). Further, the 
proposed regulations were fashioned to hold constant the liability exposure of individual audit partners (Carcello and 
Li 2013). Therefore, it is unlikely that external accountability effects driven by increased auditor liability would play 
a significant role in the theoretical effects of the proposed regulations. 
We develop a behavioral relation between the proposed regulations and audit quality based on social norm activation 
theory, which relies on internal and external accountability caused by one’s identity and the perceived expectations of 
others. According to Bicchieri’s (2006) model, a social norm is activated when individuals become aware that a 
behavioral rule is relevant to the current social setting, called the contingency condition, and a combination of 
empirical and normative expectations give individuals sufficient reason to follow the behavioral rule. Empirical 
expectations are based on the belief that a sufficiently large subset of people conform to the behavior rule in similar 
settings, and normative expectations are based on the belief that a sufficiently large subset of people expect 
conformance to the behavioral rule in similar settings. The choice to follow a social norm, therefore, is conditional 
upon one’s beliefs about the relevance of the norm to the current social setting (contingency condition), how many 
other people follow the norm in similar settings (empirical expectations), and whether one is expected to follow the 
norm in turn (normative expectations).6 
Social norm activation is conditional on one’s self-image or self-concept (Bicchieri 2006, 85-86). One of the most 
prominent of the social norms found in society is honesty (Murphy 1993). Thus, people like to think of themselves as 
honest (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008). Further, people like to think of themselves as responsible when they are asked 
to represent the interests of others. Given that misreporting on the audit report is misleading and potentially costly to 
third party investors, auditors are likely to identify honesty and responsibility as behavioral rules that would apply in 
an audit market setting (Blay et al. 2018b). This suggests that Bicchieri’s (2006) contingency condition is met for 
honesty and responsibility norms in audit market settings. This also suggests that audit regulations can increase audit 
quality by increasing the belief that other auditors conform to honesty and responsibility norms in audit settings 
(empirical expectations) or increasing the belief that auditors in general are expected to conform to these norms in the 
audit (normative expectations). 
Bicchieri’s model provides three motivations for an auditor to comply with an honesty or responsibility norm that has 
been activated in an audit market setting: 1) fear of the consequences, 2) the desire to please, and 3) acceptance of the 
social norms as valid (Bicchieri 2006, 23-24). The first motivation may exist because the auditor fears negative 
sanctions from violating an honesty or responsibility norm in the audit, such as when auditor liability exists. Bicchieri’s 
model extends traditional economic theory by including negative behavioral sanctions such as resentment that could 
exist in the absence of auditor liability. The second motivation may exist because the auditor desires to please others 
by fulfilling their normative expectations for honesty and responsibility in the audit. Again, Bicchieri’s model extends 
traditional economic theory by including positive behavioral rewards such as dignity and respect. The first two 
motivations relate to external accountability and may have economic implications for the auditor, at least in the long 
run. The third motivation has no equivalent in traditional economic theory in that it relates to internal accountability 
and provides a reason for the auditor to behave consistent with an honesty or responsibility norm even when that 
behavior is private and will not be directly observed by others. 
This discussion provides a behavioral relation between the two proposed regulations and audit quality that is 
independent of external accountability caused by increased auditor liability. Nevertheless, social norm activation 
theory also suggests that increasing auditor liability would strengthen this behavioral effect by increasing the 
consequences to violating these social norms. The theory also suggests that auditors will be differentially affected by 
the proposed regulations due to diffences in social norm sensitivity. For example, normative expectations for an 
honesty or responsibility norm may be satisfied in some auditors by the mere belief that there are valid reasons for  
  
                                                          
6 Bicchieri (2006, 59) defines social norm activation as follows: “To ‘activate’ a norm means that the subjects involved recognize that the norm 
applies: They infer from some situational cues what the appropriate behavior is, what they should expect others to do, and what they are expected 
to do themselves, and act upon those cues. It is the cues one focuses on that govern the mapping from context to interpretation and, ultimately, the 
activation of social norms.” Bicchieri’s (2006) formal model is presented in its entirety in Davidson and Stevens (2013). For a detailed discussion 
of Bicchieri’s model and its usefulness to experimental research, see Blay, Gooden, Mellon, and Stevens (2018a), and Stevens (2019). 
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following such norms, whereas other auditors may require the belief that violations of such norms will be detected 
and sanctioned. The former condition would be true of an auditor who has high social norm sensitivity whereas the 
latter would be true of an auditor who has low social norm sensitivity.7 
Given the above intuition, we expect both an auditor identity disclosure requirement and a signature requirement to 
activate social norms for honesty and responsibility in the auditor. Based on social norm activation theory (Bicchieri 
2006) and supporting experimental evidence in Blay et al. (2018b), we expect the activation of these two social norms 
to reduce misreporting in the audit report. Thus, we predict that an auditor identity disclosure requirement will reduce 
misreporting in the audit report. We also predict that a signature requirement, which also includes identity disclosure, 
will reduce misreporting in the audit report. We test these predictions formally in our first two hypotheses: 
H1: (Identity Disclosure Requirement) Requiring the auditor’s identity to be disclosed to investors will 
reduce misreporting in the audit report. 
H2: (Signature Requirement) Requiring the auditor to sign off on the audit report will reduce 
misreporting in the audit report. 
By examining both the identity disclosure requirement and the signature requirement considered by the PCAOB, we 
are also able to examine the incremental effect of a signature requirement on audit quality over an identity disclosure 
requirement alone. Given results in prior experimental studies of the effects of signing off on a code of ethics or an 
audit report without identity disclosure (Davidson and Stevens 2013; Blay et al. 2018b), we expect that adding a 
signature requirement to an identity disclosure requirement will further activate social norms for honesty and 
responsibility in the auditor. In particular, adding a signature requirement is likely to generate additional internal and 
external accountability caused by one’s identity as honest and responsible and the perceived behavioral expectations 
of others that the auditor exhibit such social norms in the audit. Thus, we predict an incremental effect of a signature 
requirement whereby adding a signature requirement to an identity disclosure requirement will further reduce 
misreporting in the audit report. We test this prediction formally in our third hypothesis: 
H3: (Incremental Effect of a Signature Requirement) Adding a signature requirement to an identity 
disclosure requirement will further reduce misreporting in the audit report. 
Experimental Method 
Experimental Audit Market 
To test our three hypotheses, we used an experimental audit market setting found in the literature (Calegari et al. 1998; 
Schatzberg et al. 2005; Blay et al. 2018b). Each audit market consisted of four auditors designated by number (one, 
two, three, and four), four clients designated by color (green, orange, yellow, and pink), and two investors designated 
by number (one and two). The auditor, client, and investor roles were randomly assigned and fixed throughout each 
experimental session.8 Each audit market operated for ten trading years and each trading year consisted of two trading 
periods.9 In order to mitigate end of period effects, participants were not informed as to how long the market would 
be in operation. To maintain independence between trading years, participants were also randomly reassigned to new 
market groups at the end of each trading year. All manipulations were on a between-subjects basis. The experimental 
audit markets were programmed and conducted using Z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). 
                                                          
7 Although Bicchieri assumes that sensitivity to a given social norm varies across individuals and particular norms, she takes an individual’s 
sensitivity to a particular norm to be a fairly stable disposition (Bicchieri 2006, 116). Nevertheless, her model suggests that even auditors with low 
social norm sensitivity can be motivated to follow an honesty or responsibility norm given sufficient situational cues that activate such norms. 
Further, her model suggests that auditors with high social norm sensitivity may not be motivated to follow these norms if such situational cues are 
absent. 
8 As with prior experimental audit markets, these three roles were labelled using neutral terminology (i.e., seller, verifier, and buyer) to guard 
against the extraneous influence of role playing. For clarity and simplification, however, we use the role labels found in practice throughout the rest 
of the paper.  
9 The inclusion of two trading periods per trading year is consistent with the economic model in Magee and Tseng (1990), which incorporated the 
motivation for low-ball pricing in period one due to quasi-rents in period two. Similar to prior experimental studies based on their model, the 
inclusion of a second period motivated auditors to violate their independence in period one by accepting premium audit fees in return for 
misreporting at the expense of investors. 
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At the start of each trading period, each of the four clients was given an asset whose value was unknown. Before they 
could sell their asset to investors, the clients were required to hire an auditor to verify and report the asset’s value. 
Each of the four auditors then submitted a separate price offer, via a sealed-offer auction, to each of the four clients to 
perform this audit service. That is, each auditor competed on price to perform an audit service for each client in the 
market. As with prior experimental studies using this audit market setting, however, offering a premium audit fee 
became a signal to clients that the auditor was willing to misreport and incur the penalty for misreporting. Next, each 
client received the price offers from each auditor, selected one auditor, and paid the selected auditor their price offer. 
Auditors then observed the value of the asset, which had a 100 percent probability of being low ($2.68). However, 
auditors could publicly report that the asset’s value was either low ($2.68) or high ($3.68). The significance of the 
auditor’s report is that the reported value determined the price the investors paid the clients for their assets.10 Each 
investor purchased an asset from two distinct clients. Investor 1 purchased the assets of the green and orange clients 
and Investor 2 purchased the assets of the yellow and pink clients. 
The earnings of participants in a given experimental session were determined as follows. All participants received a 
show-up fee of $10 in addition to their earnings during the experiment. Auditors and clients began the experiment 
with an initial endowment of $10.00 and investors began the experiment with an initial endowment of $20.00. The 
auditor’s per period earnings consisted of the fees from each client with whom (s)he contracted with, less a fixed 
observation cost of $1.60 per contract, less a $0.40 learning cost per service in the initial audit period that was waived 
in period two if the incumbent auditor was rehired by the client. Consistent with prior experiments using this market 
setting (Schatzberg et al. 2005; Blay et al. 2018b), auditors also received $0.20 per period to minimize payout 
differences between experimental roles. Lastly, the auditor was assessed a $0.05 misreporting penalty when (s)he 
misreported the value of the asset.11 
The client’s per period earnings consisted of the auditor’s reported value of the asset ($2.68 or $3.68), less the auditor’s 
fee, less a $0.30 hiring fee that was waived in period two if the incumbent auditor was rehired by the client. The 
investor’s per period earnings were zero when the auditor truthfully reported the value of the asset as low and negative 
one dollar (-$1.00) when the auditor misreported the value of the asset as high. Participants were paid in private based 
on their $10 show-up fee, their initial endowment, and their cumulative earnings from the trading periods after 
completing the post-experimental questionnaire. Prior to the experimental rounds, participants were required to 
correctly respond to seven multiple choice questions about the operation of the audit market. Table 1 presents the 
experimental payouts by participant-type. Given our experimental parameters and procedures, average payouts were 
$25.83, $35.65, and $20.17 for auditors, clients, and investors respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Competitive-Equilibrium Reporting Prediction 
As elaborated upon by Schatzberg et al. (2005, p. 241), the non-cooperative, competitive-equilibrium reporting 
prediction in our experimental audit markets is for auditors to truthfully report in both trading periods. The intuition 
behind this Nash equilibrium can be arrived at through backward induction. The only motivation for the auditor to 
misreport and incur the misreporting penalty is the opportunity to accrue future “quasi-rents” from the client.12 After 
contracting with the client at the beginning of period two, however, the auditor has no expectation of obtaining future 
quasi-rents from the client. Accordingly, no auditor (incumbent or nonincumbent) is expected to misreport in period  
  
                                                          
10 Each auditor’s price offer was restricted to range between $0.00 and $4.00, but auditors could propose different fees to different clients, and 
could make price offers below their cost if they so chose. Since each auditor submitted bids to each client, a single auditor could be hired by all 
four clients in the market. 
11 We use the same experimental parameters as the experimental audit markets in Schatzberg et al (2005), and Blay et al. (2018b) with one notable 
exception. We held the penalty for misreporting at a relatively low level of $0.05 to increase the economic incentive for misreporting in the audit 
report. 
12 DeAngelo (1981) defines quasi-rents as cost advantages that accrue to the incumbent auditor, which include technological and learning advantages 
of the incumbent as well as switching costs incurred by the client. 
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two after contracting with the client. Given the knowledge that the client will not be better off by hiring a 
nonincumbent auditor in period two (i.e. there is no credible dismissal threat), no auditor will misreport in period one 
after contracting with the client.13 
In contrast to this non-cooperative reporting strategy, prior experimental audit markets based on Magee and Tseng’s 
model have yielded a cooperative reporting strategy whereby the auditor quotes a premium audit fee that more than 
covers the penalty for misreporting as a signal to potential clients that (s)he is willing to misreport the value of the 
asset as high (Calegari et al., 1998; Schatzberg et al., 2005; Blay et al., 2018b). In period one, an auditor who contracts 
for a premium audit fee is motivated to misreport in the audit report because the client can penalize an auditor who 
does not misreport by hiring a different auditor in period two. Given that misreporting transfers $1.00 from the investor 
to the client and auditor, this cooperative behavior yields higher returns to the client and auditor than truthful reporting. 
This cooperative reporting strategy is not likely to arise in period two, however, because the auditor has a strong 
incentive to defect and report truthfully after receiving the premium audit fee. Given the lack of incentive to misreport 
in period two, we focus on misreporting behavior in period one as in Blay et al. (2018b). 
Dependent Variable 
Consistent with prior experimental studies based on Magee and Tseng’s model (Calegari et al. 1998; Schatzberg et al. 
2005; Blay et al. 2018b), the actual value observed by auditors is always low. However, auditors could report the value 
of the client’s asset as either low ($2.68) or high ($3.68). Thus, misreporting in the audit report occurred when an 
auditor reported that the client possessed a high-value asset rather than a low-value asset. Accordingly, the dependent 
variable we use to capture audit quality is a dichotomous misreporting variable (Misreport). 
Manipulated Variables 
Our experimental study incorporates a 3x1 between-participants experimental design. This design includes a control 
experimental condition with no identity disclosure requirement or signature requirement (No Disclosure or Signature), 
an experimental condition with an identity disclosure requirement (Disclosure Only), and an experimental condition 
with a signature requirement that included identity disclosure (Disclosure and Signature). The identity disclosure 
requirement was operationalized by having the auditor’s name revealed to the investor as part of the audit report and 
the signature requirement was operationalized by having the auditor type their name in addition to having their name 
revealed to the investor. Panel A of Table 2 presents a summary of our full experimental design. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Measured Variables 
We measure social norm sensitivity in the auditor using two personality scales from the JPI-R, (Jackson 1994).14 The 
Traditional Values scale assesses the degree to which an individual values traditional norms and beliefs, and is the 
opposite of moral relativism. Individuals with higher Traditional Values scores, therefore, are likely to be more 
sensitive to a norm for honest reporting. The Responsibility scale of the JPI-R captures the degree to which an 
individual feels an abstract moral obligation to other people and to society at large, and is the opposite of negligence. 
Individuals with higher Responsibility scores, therefore, are likely to be more sensitive to a norm for responsible 
reporting. Both personality scores were collected as part of a pre-experimental questionnaire by having participants 
complete 20 true/false questions, resulting in a theoretical range from 0 – 20 per personality score. Panel B of Table 
2 presents a summary of our two social norm sensitivity measures in period one. 
  
                                                          
13 Similar to Calegari et al. (1998), Schatzberg et al. (2005), and Blay et al. (2018b), we find that misreporting in period two is much lower than in 
period one. Magee and Tseng’s (1990) model also yields economic predictions regarding auditor fee behavior. Since auditor fees are not examined 
in this study, however, we omit discussion of these predictions and results. 
14 The JPI-R is a 300-item instrument that measures 15 personality scales that are relevant to the functioning of a person in a wide range of settings 
including: work, organizational behavior, and interpersonal situations. Experimental researchers have used the JPI-R to examine the effect of social 
norms on honest reporting in auditing (Blay et al. 2018b) and participative budgeting settings (Stevens 2002; Hobson, Mellon, and Stevens 2011). 
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Results 
Participants and Manipulation Checks 
The experimental audit markets we report involved 120 undergraduate students from a large southeastern university. 
As discussed above, participants were randomly assigned roles such that each market was comprised of four auditors, 
four clients, and two investors. To achieve independent observations, participants were informed that they would be 
randomly reassigned to a new audit market at the end of each investment year (two periods). This is an experimental 
design departure from early experimental studies using Magee and Tseng’s model (Calegari et al. 1998; Schatzberg 
et al. 2005), and was chosen in order to reduce the serial correlation in previous studies (Blay et al. 2018b). However, 
it is possible that our observations are influenced by a simultaneous learning process by individual market participants 
across the audit markets. As such, due care should be followed when interpreting our statistical tests. 
We use responses to items on the exit questionnaire to test the effectiveness of our experimental manipulations. 
Responses ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (4 = neutral). Participants responded to the 
following question regarding the identity disclosure experimental manipulation: “When reporting the value of the 
asset the auditor’s actual name was disclosed to the investor.”15 Participants in the two disclosure treatments 
(Disclosure Only and Disclosure and Signature) responded differently to this statement than participants in the 
nondisclosure control group (t = 7.950, d.f. = 118, p < 0.001).16 The mean response of 5.06 (SD = 2.22) for participants 
in the two disclosure treatments is significantly above the neutral response of 4 (t = 4.284, d.f. = 79, p < 0.01) whereas 
the mean response of 1.85 (SD = 1.79) for participants in the No Disclosure or Signature control group is significantly 
below the neutral response of 4 (t = 7.592, d.f. = 39, p < 0.01). This suggests that our identity disclosure manipulation 
was successful. 
Participants responded to the following question regarding the auditor signature manipulation: “Prior to submitting 
their audit report, each auditor was required to type their name on their report.” Participants in the Disclosure and 
Signature treatment responded differently to this statement than participants in the No Disclosure or Signature 
treatment or the Disclosure Only treatment (t = 8.599, d.f. = 118, p < 0.001). The mean response of 5.18 (SD = 2.41) 
for participants in the Disclosure and Signature treatment is significantly above the neutral response of 4 (t = 3.089, 
d.f. = 39, p < 0.01) whereas the mean response of 1.98 (SD = 1.63) for participants in the other two treatments is 
significantly below the neutral response of 4 (t = 11.110, d.f. = 79, p < 0.01). This suggests that our auditor signature 
manipulation was successful. 
Hypothesis Tests 
As discussed above, an incentive for the auditor to violate independence and misreport in the audit report was only 
present in period one. Consistent with Blay et al. (2018b), therefore, we use misreporting behavior in period one to 
test our three hypotheses. Table 3 presents the average misreporting in period one across the three experimental 
conditions and by low and high social norm sensitivity. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the results for overall 
misreporting show less misreporting in the Disclosure Only condition (30.3%) than in the No Disclosure or Signature 
condition (41.9%). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the results for overall misreporting also show less misreporting in 
the Disclosure and Signature condition (26.1%) than in the No Disclosure or Signature condition (41.9%). According 
to untabled Pearson chi-square tests of significance, these differences are statistically significant at the 5% level (χ2(1, 
N=302) = 4.367, p = 0.037) and 1% level (χ2(1, N=294) = 7.990, p = .005), respectively. The results for overall 
misreporting, therefore, support the predicted effects of the two regulations recently considered by the PCAOB. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Our third hypothesis predicts an incremental effect of the signature requirement over the identity disclosure 
requirement. While the results for overall misreporting show less misreporting in the Disclosure and Signature 
condition (26.1%) than in the Disclosure Only condition (30.3%), an untabled Pearson chi-square test reveals that this 
difference is not statistically significant (χ2(1, N=276) = 0.589, p = 0.443). Our social norm theory suggests, however, 
that our predicted effects will be driven by auditors with higher social norm sensitivity. To explore the effect of social 
                                                          
15 As discussed above, we used the labels “verifier” and “buyer” in place of “auditor” and “investor” in both the instructions and exit questionnaire 
items. 
16 All of our manipulation check analysis included all participants (120 total), and all participant types (verifiers, buyers, and auditors). 
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norm sensitivity on our results, we initially perform a median split of participants based on our two measures of social 
norm sensitivity from the JPI-R and present average misreporting by low and high social norm sensitivity.17 While 
our two measures of social norm sensitivity are highly correlated (Pearson Correlation = .461, p = .001), Table 3 
reveals that the results are stronger using the Responsibility scale than the Traditional Values scale. The results for 
auditors who scored high in Traditional Values show less misreporting in the Disclosure and Signature condition 
(22.0%) than in the Disclosure Only condition (27.0%), but an untabled Pearson chi-square test reveals that this 
difference is not statistically significant (χ2(1, N=119) = 0.273, one-tailed p = 0.183). The results for auditors who 
scored high in Responsibility, however, reveal that the difference between misreporting in the Disclosure and 
Signature condition (3.1%) is highly significantly different from the Disclosure Only condition (17.8%), (χ2(1, N=154) 
= 3.890, one-tailed p = 0.003). The weaker results for the Traditional Values scale can be explained by the fact that it 
captures other values besides honesty (e.g., frugality, modesty, respect for authority, and patriotism). Thus, the 
Traditional Values scale we used to capture the auditor’s sensitivity to an honesty norm is likely a weak measure of 
our theoretical construct. 
To more adequately control for social norm sensitivity and the presence of other variables in the model, we perform 
multivariate logistic regression analysis to test our three hypotheses. We present four logistic regression models of 
misreporting in period one in Table 4. In the first two regression models, both Disclosure and Disclosure & Signature 
are significant at the 5% level when alone in the model (Model 1) and with the accepted audit fee in the model (Model 
2). The accepted audit fee captures cooperative behavior between the auditor and the client at the expense of investors, 
and is significantly positive as predicted (p < 0.05) when included in the model. These results provide strong evidence 
that the identity disclosure requirement and the signature requirement reduce misreporting in the audit report, 
consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. Because this multivariate analysis controls for other variables in the model, the 
significance of the Disclosure & Signature variable also provides strong evidence that adding a signature requirement 
to the identity disclosure requirement further reduces misreporting in the audit report, consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
The third regression model (Model 3) shows that Disclosure becomes insignificant and Signature & Disclosure is 
only marginally significant (p < 0.10) when the Responsibility and Traditional Values variables are added to the model. 
Consistent with the univariate results above, Responsibility is highly significant (p < 0.01) while Traditional Values 
is not significant (p > 0.10) when included in the model. To directly test our underlying social norm theory, the fourth 
regression model (Model 4) includes a dichotomous variable for High Responsibility auditors and the two interactions 
of this variable with our two manipulations. This regression model shows the best fit with the data as revealed in both 
the Chi-square statistic and the Negelkerke R2. The main effect for High Responsibility and the two interaction terms 
are highly significant (p < 0.01) when added to the model, revealing that auditors who scored high on this measure of 
social norm sensitivity exhibited lower misreporting on average and significantly reduced their misreporting in 
response to the two experimental manipulations. These results provide evidence that the effects we document are 
driven by participants with higher sensitivity to social norms consistent with our underlying social norm theory. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Conclusion 
After considering a proposal to require the engagement partner’s signature on the audit report (PCAOB 2009), the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board chose instead to only require the disclosure of the engagement partner’s 
name (PCAOB 2015). This choice was made, however, without supporting theory or empirical evidence. The PCAOB 
based its initial arguments in support of the two requirements on the potential for each one to increase audit quality 
by increasing transparency and accountability in the audit. Traditional theory in social psychology and economics, 
however, provides little support for this accountability argument. The accountability literature in social psychology 
relies on the potential for face-to-face justification (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, 255) and the proposed regulations were 
fashioned to hold constant the liability exposure of individual audit partners (Carcello and Li 2013). We develop a 
behavioral relation between the proposed regulations and audit quality based on social norm activation theory, which 
relies on internal and external accountability caused by one’s identity and the perceived expectations of others. Our 
social norm theory provides theoretical support for the accountability argument put forth by the PCAOB, yet yields 
new insights regarding the form of that accountability and the potential for the proposed regulations to improve audit 
quality. 
                                                          
17 We also performed identical analyses using one standard deviation above the mean and obtained inferentially identical results. 
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We test our behavioral relation between the two proposed requirements and audit quality using an experimental audit 
market setting found in the literature. We find that both an identity disclosure requirement and a signature requirement 
reduce misreporting in the audit report compared to a control setting with neither requirement present. Using a 
multivariate regression analysis, we also document that the signature requirement generates an incremental reduction 
in misreporting when added to the disclosure requirement. Finally, we provide evidence that the effects we document 
are driven by participants with higher sensitivity to social norms as measured by a pre-experiment personality 
questionnaire. This evidence supports our social norm theory and suggests that policymakers should consider such 
theory in future policy deliberations. 
As with prior experimental audit market studies (Calegari et al. 1998; Schatzberg et al. 2005; Blay et al. 2018b), we 
base our audit market setting on Magee and Tseng’s (1990) model of audit pricing and independence. Thus, our 
experimental setting captures essential features of audit markets in practice. Given this feature of our experimental 
audit market, we believe that our study provides useful theory and empirical evidence regarding the new identity 
disclosure requirement at the PCAOB and helps explain the frequent use of auditor signature requirements in many 
non-U.S. countries. For example, our study supports the usefulness of social norm theory in describing differences in 
auditing regulations and policy across various countries. In particular, our evidence suggests that non-U.S. countries 
may have higher levels of social norm sensitivity or may rely on such sensitivity to a greater extent than U.S. 
policymakers. This opens up a whole new area of research examining cultural differences in social norm sensitivity 
and potential ways of increasing such sensitivity in auditors. This supports the use of social norm theory as both a 
positive and normative theory for auditing research. 
Our results appear to conflict with a recent experimental study by Cianci et al. (2017), who find that audit partner 
participants make less conservative write-down recommendations when they are told to assume that the PCAOB has 
issued a new standard requiring that their name be disclosed or their signature appear on the audit report. Our 
experimental study differs from theirs in several important aspects. First, our audit market setting contains an 
economic incentive to misreport in the audit report and the potential for social norm activation to offset this incentive. 
Second, we use student participants rather than audit partners. Given our desire to provide a strong test of economic 
and social norm theory, our use of student participants appears appropriate (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002). 
Cianci et al.’s use of audit partners also appears appropriate as it allowed them to test theory suggesting that the 
regulations would reduce commitment to the profession and the public in audit partners. Thus, our two studies provide 
different yet complementary perspectives and promote the importance of examining potential regulations with 
multiple research methods. Nevertheless, further research appears warranted to reconcile our experimental results with 
theirs. 
The results and implications of this study are subject to the normal caveats associated with experimental research. In 
particular, this study contains a stark audit market setting that abstracts significantly from audit market settings in 
practice. For example, investors are passive players in our audit market and other elements of external accountability 
such as litigation risk are intentionally excluded. We consider this to be a strength of our study because it enables us 
to isolate the behavioral mechanisms raised by the PCAOB in their deliberations of the two proposed regulations, 
which were specifically designed to control for increased litigation risk (PCAOB 2009, PCAOB 2015). Our theory 
and experimental evidence suggest that these two regulations could improve audit quality by activating social norms 
in the auditor. Our theory also suggests that incorporating auditor litigation would strengthen these social norm effects. 
Another potential extension of this research is to examine how external accountability mechanisms such as investor 
activism or auditor liability interact with social norm activation to affect audit quality. 
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Participant-Type 
TABLE 1 
 
Experimental Payouts by Participant-type 
  
 Mean 
   
 Minimum  
    
Maximum    
  
Auditors (Verifiers)  
  
Clients (Sellers)  
  
Investors (Buyers)  
  
 
$25.83 
   
$35.65 
 
$20.17 
 
   
 $10.00  
     
 $24.38  
   
 $11.00  
   
    
$39.25    
    
$51.84    
    
$27.00    
    
All participants were paid a $10 show-up fee in addition to their cumulative earnings during the 
experimental session. Auditors began the experiment with an initial endowment of $10 and received their 
selected audit fee less a fixed observation cost of $1.60, less an initial learning cost of $0.40, and less a 
$0.05 misreporting fee each time the auditor reported the value of the asset as high ($3.68). Auditors 
could avoid the initial learning fee if they were rehired by the same client in period two of a given trading 
year. Auditors also received $0.20 per period to reduce differences in payouts among participants. Clients 
began the experiment with an initial endowment of $10 and received the auditor reported value of their 
asset each period (either $2.68 or $3.68) less the selected audit fee and less a $0.30 new hire fee. Clients 
could avoid the new hire fee in period two of a given trading year by selecting the incumbent auditor. 
Investors began the experiment with an initial endowment of $20 and made $0.00 each time their auditor 
truthfully reported the value of the asset as low ($2.68) and lost $1.00 each time their auditor misreported 
the value of the asset as high ($3.68).  
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TABLE 2  
Experimental Design and Social Norm Sensitivity Measures 
 
  
 
Panel A: Full Experimental Design 
  
 Experimental Conditions 
 
No Disclosure or 
Signature Disclosure Only 
Disclosure and 
Signature 
Number of Sessions 
Total Participants 
Auditor Participants 
Total Trading Years 
Periods per Trading Year 
Reporting Observations 
2 sessions 
40 
16 
10 
2 
320 
2 sessions 
40 
16 
10 
2 
320 
2 sessions 
40 
16 
10 
2 
320 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Social Norm Sensitivity Measures for Auditor Participants in Period One 
   
Experimental Conditions 
No Disclosure or 
Signature Disclosure Only 
Disclosure and 
Signature 
 n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. 
Traditional Values 160 10.23 3.162 142 9.18 3.205 134 8.44 2.976 
Low Traditional Values 
High Traditional Values 
52 
108 
5.33 
10.75 
2.881 
1.601 
105 
37 
8.02 
12.03 
1.152 
2.101 
52 
82 
7.04 
11.84 
1.546 
1.959 
Responsibility 160 12.88 2.820 142 11.95 3.042 134 10.73 2.517 
Low Responsibility  
High Responsibility 
133 
27 
10.20 
15.81 
2.138 
1.210 
52 
90 
8.37 
15.02 
1.657 
1.038 
70 
64 
10.34 
14.19 
1.339 
0.833 
          
          
Panel A presents our full experimental design. Two sessions were conducted for each experimental condition via 
networked computer terminals using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). In the No Disclosure or Signature 
experimental control condition, the auditor made reporting decisions without either an identity disclosure or a 
signature requirement. In the Disclosure Only experimental condition the auditor’s name was disclosed to the 
investor as part of the audit report. In the Disclosure and Signature experimental condition the auditor’s name 
was disclosed to the investor and the auditor also typed their name as part of the audit report. Each session was 
conducted with enough participants to allow two markets to operate simultaneously. Each market consisted of four 
auditors, four clients, and two investors. Each trading year consisted of two periods, whereby auditors and clients 
could reduce costs in period two by recontracting (See Table 1). To eliminate group confounds and learning 
effects, participants were randomly reassigned to new market groups at the end of each trading year. 
 
Panel B reports a summary of our social norm sensitivity measures in period one. As with prior experimental audit 
markets, we focus on period one where auditor participants have an incentive to misreport in the audit report. The 
Traditional Values scale of the JPI-R questionnaire measures the degree to which an individual incorporates old 
values such as honesty, frugality, modesty, respect for authority, and patriotism, and ranges from 0 to 20. High 
Traditional Values incorporates participants who score above the sample median for this scale. The 
Responsibility scale of the JPI-R measures a person’s overall sensitivity to moral obligations to other people and 
to society at large, and ranges from 0 to 20. High Responsibility incorporates participants who score above the 
sample median for this scale. The imbalance in cell sizes for the social norm measures is due to the fact that each 
auditor could be selected by up to four clients. Further, some auditor participants were removed from the analyses 
because they went bankrupt (cumulative earnings were negative) during the experimental session. However, the 
results reported herein are qualitatively and inferentially similar if all auditor participants are included in the 
analysis. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Misreporting in Period One across Experimental Conditions and 
by Low and High Social Norm Sensitivity† 
      
       
 Experimental Conditions 
No Disclosure or 
Signature 
Disclosure and 
Signature  Disclosure Only 
 n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. 
Overall Misreporting 160 41.9% 0.495 142 30.3% 0.461 134 26.1% 0.441 
Low Traditional Values 52 67.3% 0.474 105 31.4% 0.466 52 32.7% 0.474 
High Traditional Values 108 29.6% 0.459 37 27.0% 0.450 82 22.0% 0.416 
Low Responsibility  133 42.1% 0.496 52 51.9% 0.505 70 47.1% 0.503 
High Responsibility 
 
 
27 
 
40.7% 
 
0.501 90 
 
17.8% 
 
0.384 64 3.1% 
 
0.175 
 
 
   
        
†Misreporting is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the auditor misreported in period one and 0 otherwise. As 
with prior experimental audit markets, we focus on period one where auditor participants have an incentive to 
misreport in the audit report. The Traditional Values scale of the JPI-R questionnaire measures the degree to which 
an individual incorporates old values such as honesty, frugality, modesty, respect for authority, and patriotism, 
and ranges from 0 to 20. High Traditional Values incorporates participants who score above the sample median 
for this scale. The Responsibility scale of the JPI-R measures a person’s overall sensitivity to moral obligations to 
other people and to society at large, and ranges from 0 to 20. High Responsibility incorporates participants who 
score above the sample median for this scale. 
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TABLE 4 
Logistic Regression Models of Misreporting in Period One 
Model 1: Misreport† = α0 + β1Disclosure + β2Signature & Disclosure + ε 
 
Model 2: Misreport† = α0 + β1
 
Disclosure + β2Signature & Disclosure + β3Fee + ε 
Model 3: Misreport† = α0 + β1Disclosure + β2Signature & Disclosure + β3Fee + β4Responsibility + β5Traditional 
 
Values + ε 
Model 4: Misreport† = α0 + β1Disclosure + β2Signature & Disclosure + β3Fee + β4Responsibility + β5Traditional 
Values + β6HIR + β7HIRxDO + β8HIRxDS + ε 
Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept    –0.716***  
        (.103) 
      p < .001 
–0.723*** 
     (.104) 
   p < .001 
–0.796*** 
(.112)      
p < .001 
–0.794*** 
     (.141)  
     p < .001 
    
Disclosure (DO)a –  –0.506** 
       (.243) 
     p = .019 
–0.452** 
     (.245) 
   p = .033 
–0.201 
      (.266)  
p = .225 
–0.200 
      (.280)  
     p = .122 
Disclosure & Signature (DS)b  –   –0.712*** 
       (.254) 
     p = .003 
–0.597** 
     (.260) 
   p = .011 
–0.393* 
      (.271) 
p = .074 
–1.039*** 
      (.387)  
     p = .004 
Feec +       0.006** 
      (.003) 
    p = .018 
  0.005** 
      (.003)  
p = .038 
   0.006** 
      (.003)  
     p = .035 
Responsibility (RES)d –    –0.248*** 
      (.045) 
p < .001 
 
Traditional Values (TV)e –    –0.003 
      (.047) 
p = .477 
 
High Responsibility (HIR)f –     –1.574*** 
    (.309)  
   p < .001 
HIRxDO –     –1.478*** 
    (.584)  
   p = .006 
HIRxDS –     –3.200*** 
    (.863)  
   p < .001 
Model Statistics        
Chi-square     8.943 13.466     58.853    69.575 
N        436      436          436         436 
Model df            2 3       5             7 
Overall Model Significance      .011     .004   p < .001  p < .001 
Nagelkerke R2       .028     .042         .175        .205 
       
Table 4 presents the results of logistic regression models of misreporting in the audit report in period one. Standard errors 
for each regression coefficient are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * Denote one-tailed significance at the .01, .05, and 
.10 levels respectively. 
† Misreport: Dichotomous variable coded as 1 if auditor misreported in period one and 0 otherwise. 
a Disclosure (DO): Coded as 1 if auditors’ names were disclosed to the investors and 0 otherwise. 
b Disclosure and Signature (DS): Coded as 1 if auditors’ typed in their name as part of the audit and their names were 
disclosed to investors and 0 otherwise. 
c Fee: Accepted audit fee bid. 
d Responsibility (RES): Overall sensitivity to moral obligations to other people and to society at large as measured by 
the Responsibility scale of the JPI-R, which ranges from 0 to 20. 
e Traditional Values (TV): The degree to which an individual incorporates old values, such as honesty, frugality, 
modesty, respect for authority, and patriotism as measured by the Traditional Values scale of the JPI-R, which ranges 
from 0 to 20.  
f HIR: High Responsibility is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the participant's Responsibility score was above the 
median and 0 otherwise. 
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